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Monetary policy in Germany is conducted by the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, which was established by the Bank Act of July 1957. The
Bundesbank is headed by a Central Bank Council, which consists of
the president, the vice president, and the presidents of the Central
Banks in the states (Lander). All of these are appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Federal Republic. The Lander Central Banks are, in fact,
branches of the Bundesbank. Before 1957, central banking in Ger-
many was conducted by the Bank Deutscher Lander [BDL], which
was established in November 1948. This bank differed somewhat in
concept from its successor by having a more decentralized structure. It
was conceived as the coordinating body of the Lander Central Banks,
and its president was elected by their directors. However, the differ-
ences in mode of operation between the Bundesbank and its predeces-
sor, the BDL, were of minor significance.
The Bundesbank is autonomous, and is not subject to any direction
by the federal government. The 1957 Bank Act provides for partici-
pation of government representatives—without voting rights—in meet-
ings of the Bundesbank Council, and of the Bundesbank president in
the government's deliberations on monetary policy. But the Bundes-
bank is not bound in any way by the government, nor is it committed
to fulfill any government request or requirement. The Bundesbank
does, of course, act as the government's banking agent. The fed-
eral government and the Lander are committed to hold their deposits
at the Bundesbank. They may hold deposits at other banks only with
the Bundesbank's consent. Under this provision the latter has granted
the Lander governments rights to hold deposits, within specifiedGermany 59
quotas,at certain financial institutions. The Bundesbank is entitled
to grant the federal government, the Lander, and certain public Spe-
cial Funds short-term credits within quotas specified in the Bank Act.
This does not mean, however, that the Bundesbank is committed to
extend these credits. Decisions on credits within the quotas are made
at the Bundesbank's discretion.
The Bundesbank has at its disposal all of the major conventional
tools of monetary policy and has used them extensively. These instru-
ments will be surveyed here briefly.
Discount Rate. The Bank buys and sells short-term bills (up to three
months) which fulfill certain requirements at the fixed discount rate.
These include, among others, Treasury bills and bills issued by the
Lander or other public authorities. The discount rate has in fact been
uniform, at any given point of time, for all the bills; but the Bank, in
principle, has the right to discriminate among various categories of
bills.
The Bank also makes loans to commercial banks against collateral.
The securities eligible for collateral are government bills and bonds
or other debentures listed by the Bank. The interest rate applied to
such loans is usually 1 per cent above the discount rate. Lending in
this form is not automatic; it is presumably intended to meet short-
term liquidity gaps at the commercial banks. The interest rate charged
by banks on loans to their customers is tied by law to the discount
rate, which it cannot exceed by more than a specified percentage. As
long as the difference between the two rates is this maximum, any
reduction of the discount rate leads directly to an equivalent reduc-
tion in the interest rate charged by banks on their lending (although
this would not necessarily hold true for an increase). Often, however,
the gap between the two rates is less than the specified maximum, so
that the effect of discount rate changes on rates charged by the banks
is not automatic and is less direct.
The Bank is entitled, and has consistently used its right, to specify
a maximum rediscount quota for each individual bank. This quota is
usually determined on the basis of the bank's capital: it is a certain
coefficient of the size of the capital, but the coefficient may vary among
classes of banks. The Bank has used changes in this coefficient, and60 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
thus in the individual quotas, as an instrument of monetary policy
on a number of occasions.
Open-Market Operations. The Bundesbank is entitled to buy and sell
all the bills eligible for rediscounting at the Bank, as well as other
bills or bonds issued by the federal government, the Lander, and
other public authorities, and also private bonds quoted on the stock
exchange.
In fact, open-market operations were of minor significance in the
earlier years, since the central bank (at that time, the BDL) had had
almost no portfolio of marketable securities. By mid-1955, however, the
central bank reached an agreement with the government, which in
1957 was incorporated in the Bank Act, putting a substantial amount
of such securities at the Bank's disposal. This was done by transform-
ing the character of the "equalization claims," i.e., the Bank's claims
on the government resulting from the Bank's assumption of the gov-
ernment's obligations towards the commercial banks, which in turn
were a product of the currency reform of 1948. Originally, these
claims carried an interest rate of 3 per cent, and could be sold only at
their nominal value; in fact, this provision meant that the claims
were not marketable. The agreement under consideration freed the
Bank to sell (and buy) these claims at other prices. The claims, which
subsequently became known also as the "Mobilization Paper," origi-
nally amounted to some eight billion marks. Open-market operations,
which since 1956 have assumed large proportions, have been conducted
primarily in this paper.
An agreement between the Bank and the commercial banks leads,
in fact, to excluding the nonbank private sector from participation in
the market for the paper in which the Bank's open-market transactions
are conducted; that is, open-market operations are made only between
the Bank and commercial banks, without any immediate effect on the
nonbank sector.
An important attribute of open-market operations in Germany is
that the Bundesbank directly determines not quantity but price in
these transactions. The Bank specifies an interest rate—that is, by im-
plication, prices of securities—at which the Bank is willing to buy or
sell eligible securities offered to it or demanded from it. The interest
rate varies, as a rule, with the length of maturity of the security (Mo-Germany 61
bilization Paper has been issued with various maturities). This, of
course, is a procedure quite similar to determining the Bank's dis.
count rate. Indeed, the open-market rate has, as a rule, been quite
close to the discount rate; but variations in the open-market posted
rate have been much more frequent than in the discount rate.
Reserve Requirements. Minimum reserve requirements have been in
effect since 1948, and are incorporated in the Bank Act of 1957. The
Bundesbank is entitled to require that the commercial banks hold re-
serves in the form of current balances at the Bundesbank. The require-
ments may vary among classes of banks and according to the type of
liability against which reserves are held. The maximum ratios pro-
vided for in the act were 30 per cent for sight deposits, 20 per cent
for time deposits and 10 per cent for savings deposits. In addition to
the distinction as to the type of liabilities, the Bundesbank require-
ments distinguish between banks in "bank places"—that is, places in
which branches of the Bundesbank are located—and other banks; the
former are subject to higher reserve requirements. Likewise, banks
are divided into six categories according to the size of their liabilities;
the larger the bank, the higher the reserve requirements. The num-
ber of different reserve-ratio requirements existing at any moment of
time is, thus, quite substantial (approximately fifteen to twenty). As
a rule, this structure moves in a coordinated way, and the proportional
differences among the various ratios remain about constant.
Most of the time, reserve requirements were put on an average (or
total) basis for each class of bank and liability. During a short period,
however, marginal reserve ratios were added. In July 1960, all in-
creases in liabilities above their average level of March—May 1960 were
subject to the maximum reserve requirements, while liabilities of the
average size of March—May 1960 were subject to lower requirements.
This situation lasted until December 1960, when the marginal reserve
requirements were withdrawn.
Shortages of reserves are subject to penalty rates of 3 per cent above
the rate in force for the Bank's advances against collateral. This
means, as a rule, an interest rate 4 per cent over the discount rate.
Changes in reserve requirements were made about as often as they
were in the discount rate; they were, thus, much less frequent than
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bank regarded open-market operations as the main instrument for
effecting gradual changes in bank liquidity and in interest rates; while
changes in the discount rate and in reserve ratio requirements were
made at longer intervals as a means of consolidating and reinforcing
the effect of open-market operations.
Reserve requirements were used by the Bundesbank on a few occa-
sions to directly influence commercial banks' policy towards holding
assets or borrowing abroad. This was done by subjecting foreign de-
posits in German banks, and the latter's borrowings from abroad, to
special reserve requirements and by varying these requirements. Like-
wise, German banks' holdings abroad were regarded as a reserve asset
held against liabilities to foreigners on a number of occasions when
the Bundesbank considered short-term investments of German banks
abroad to be desirable.
FISCAL POLICY
For most purposes of analyzing fiscal policy in Germany, the cate-
gory "government" should include the Lander as well as the federal
government. The reason is that the budgets of these two bodies are
quite closely integrated, particularly on the revenue side. The German
Constitution specifies the allocation of the various tax revenues. In
some cases (such as the business tax), all tax proceeds belong to the
Lander. In others, they belong to the federal government. The pro-
ceeds of the income tax are divided between the two—about two-thirds
to the Lander and one-third to the federal government. In addition,
revenues are reallocated among the Lander—those with higher tax
proceeds transfer part of their revenues to the others. Likewise, most
of the tax laws of each Land have to be approved by the appropriate
federal bodies. All of this would indicate the need to add the Lönder
to the federal government in discussions of budgets and budgetary
policy.
In the federal government, budgetary policy is left in the hands of
the executive branch to a probably greater extent than in most other
Western countries. The Cabinet (and within it the Chancellor and
the Minister of Finance) has a veto power over budgetary decisions.
The executive branch's leeway is particularly large in "negative"
acts; that is, the Cabinet is quite free not to make certain expenditures,Germany 63
ornot to raise revenue from certain taxes, even though it is entitled to
do so by the budgetary law of that year.
The federal budget is divided into "ordinary" (above the line) and
"extraordinary"(below the line) components. In principle, "ordi-
nary" budget expenditures should be covered by tax revenues, while
expenditures of the "extraordinary" budget could be covered by loans
as long as they result in the acquisition of "self-liquidating" assets.
In fact, this requirement is interpreted in a way which puts very few
restrictions on the type of expenditures in the latter budget. Yet, the
declared policy of the German government has been to maintain a
(cash) balance in the over-all budget; and this indeed has been the
policy over long stretches of time.
2. Statistical Analysis
The analysis of policy reactions to balance-of-payments disturbances
seems particularly complicated in Germany due to the largely one-
sided nature of the imbalances. During the years 1952—58, that is, for
about half of the total period covered, there was a continual surplus
in the balance of payments, and foreign exchange reserves kept ac-
cumulating. This makes it impossible to examine policy reactions to
changes in the balance of payments from deficits to surpluses, and
vice versa, during these years. To overcome this difficulty—to some ex-
tent, at least—several approaches may be explored.
First, one might analyze just the years remaining after the 1952—58
period is subtracted, in which periodic changes in the direction of the
imbalance did occur. Two periods of downward movement can be
distinguished prior to the continuous upward movement of reserves
which started in 1952; they took place in late 1950 to early 1951, and
a year later. These can certainly be viewed as periods of disturbances.
Upward movements of reserves during most of 1950 and most of 1951,
on the other hand, may not have been regarded as disturbances. They
may have been part of the general strong upward trend of reserves
which lasted until the end of 1958; that is, the German government
may have considered these upward movements desirable, rather than
as indicative of disturbances. From 1959 on, each downward or up-
ward movement could be considered a disturbance; a slight over-all
rising trend in reserves is still found in these years but the trend fac-64 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
tor is not large in comparison to the size of the periodical fluctuations.
The subperiods are determined by both the series of foreign ex-
change reserves and, since 1958, of balance-of-payments surpluses or
deficits. By and large, the two series give the same indications for the
years covered by both. Sometimes, the two may differ by one quarter
in their indication of the turning point. In the very few cases of clear
conflict between the two series, the turning point was selected by ref-
erence to the series of balance-of-payments surpluses and deficits.
Table 6 shows subperiods of disturbances. The table covers two pe-
riods of downward disturbances prior to 1952, and all the post-1958
period—the latter containing three subperiods of downward and
two subperiods of upward disturbances. Altogether, seven subperiods
of imbalances are represented in Table 6. This is not a large number
of observations, yet it provides quite a strong impression of the policy
behavior pattern—at least in the negative sense.
A look, first, at the discount rate (column 2) shows clearly that this
instrument has not been used generally for balance-of-payments ad-
justment. In only two downward disturbances, the one following the
outbreak of the Korean war and the one which started in mid-1964,
was the discount rate manipulated in the direction that balance-of-
payments adjustment would require. During the other disturbances,
the discount rate was either kept stable or moved in both directions
within each subperiod of imbalance.
The posted rate for open-market operations (column 3) shows much
the same behavior. Again, in one recent imbalance only—the down-
ward movement of mid-1964 to early 1966—was this rate changed in
the direction required for balance-of-payments adjustment. Thus,
open-market operations do not appear to have been intended to serve
generally the target of balance-of-payments equilibrium.
The same impression is conveyed by the fluctuations of reserve
ratio requirements, which are shown in column 4. Once more, oniy
during the 1950—51 and the 1964 and subsequent disequilibria did
reserve ratio requirements move in the direction necessary for adjust-
ment.
It thus appears that all the three major direct instruments at the
disposal of the German central bank—changes of the discount rate,
open-market operations, and changes of minimum reserve ratio re-
quirements—have not been used, as a rule, for balance-of-paymentsGermany 65
TABLE 6
Germany: Movements of Policy Variables





(indication Open- Ratio Claims on
of dis- Discount Market Require- Commer-
turbance) Rate Rate ments cial Banks
Subperiod (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
III 1950—I 1951 fall + raised
a + raised —rise
III 195 1—1 1952 fall * stable a * stable *notrend
IV 1958—Ill 1959 fall * notrend* notrend* stable *stable
III 1959—11 1961 rise * notrend* notrend— raised *notrend
111961—11962 fall * stable — reduced— reduced *stable
I 1962—I 1963 stable stable raised stable rise
1 1963—11 1964 rise * stable * stable * stable + rise






















III 1950—I 1951 * stable — rise + falls+ falls n.a.
111 195 1—I 1952+ fall + fall * stable* stable balanced
IV 1958—Ill 1959— rise — rise n.a.+ falls —largedeficit
III 1959—Il 1961— fall — fall n.a. — falls no trend
111961—11962 — rise — rise + falls — rises —smalldeficit
I 1962—I 1963 no trendrise stable falls small deficit
I 1963—lI 1964 * notrend+ rise * stable* stable+ deficit
111964— — rise — risesharply*stable* stable*deficit
Note: + indicates a movement in the direction required for balance-of-payment
adjustment.
—indicatesa movement in the opposite direction.
*indicatesno movement or a very slight one.
na. =notavailable.
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adjustment. There are only two instances which may be exceptions,
i.e., the downward disturbances of late 1950 and early 1951 and of
mid-1964 to early 1966.
Looking at the policy variables which involve the central bank's
assets, similar indications appear, perhaps even more strongly. Central
bank lending to the commercial banking system (represented in col.
umn 5 of Table 6) appears to be unrelated to balance-of-payments
fluctuations. Central bank net lending to the government (in column
6) seems to move less often in the direction required for balance-of-
payments adjustment than in the opposite direction; this is particu-
larly true for the post-1958 period. Changes in this category are mainly
due, in the case of Germany, not to changes in the central bank's gross
lending to the government but to changes in the amount of govern-
ment deposits at the central bank. As may be seen by comparing col-
umn 6 with column 10 (or the appropriate lines in Chart 4), fluctua-
tions in the central bank's net lending to the government are to some
extent related to the government's budgetary surpluses and deficits.
But the correlation is not perfect due to the reflection of two other fac-
tors aside from the budgetary balance in the size of the government's
net indebtedness to the Bank; namely, open-market operations and
the distribution of government deposits between the Bank and other
banks.
Since the Bank's lending to commercial banks does not move in
conformity with the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment,
while net lending to the government moves most often in the direc-
tion opposite to these requirements, the Bank's total domestic assets—
the combination of these two—most of the time moves counter to the
requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment. This is shown in col-
umn 7 of Table 6. According to the Nurkse-Bloomfield yardstick, Ger-
many is thus seen to follow a pattern of monetary policy, during the
subperiods under observation, opposite to what the classical "rules of
the game" would require.
Commercial bank lending (shown in column 8) does not seem to
vary in any consistent way with imbalances of payments. In only one
instance—the downward disturbance of II 1961—I 1962—did the rate of
credit expansion change in conformity with he requirements for bal-
ance-of-payments adjustment: it was considerably below the rate in
the preceding and succeeding periods, in which foreign exchange re-Germany 69
serves increased. In other instances, the rate of credit expansion re-
mained usually rather stable. Thus it may be deduced that the amount
of credit (or, more precisely, its rate of expansion) was not manipu-
lated in accordance with the requirements for balance-of-payments ad-
justment, although it cannot be said that an opposite pattern emerges
either. The rate of expansion of money supply (represented in column
9) gives a similar indication. This rate is quite stable most of the
time, and the modest changes in it move as often in the adjusting di-
rection as in the opposite. Thus, although it cannot be argued that
money supply changed consistently in a disadjusting direction,it
seems fairly obvious that this variable did not move, in any general
way, in the direction required for balance-of-payments adjustment. By
this yardstick too, monetary policy in Germany did not conform to the
classical "rules of the game."
Turning finally to the fiscal area, the conclusions are similar. As
may be seen from column 10 of Table 6, the budgetary (cash) bal-
ance did not fluctuate in any consistent way with imbalances of pay-
ments. Moreover, it should be added that the balances (surpluses or
deficits) were in general too small, in comparison with components
such as the GNP, changes in foreign exchange reserves, etc., to be ex-
pected to have any appreciable effect on the economy. It is thus most
probable that budgetary balances were not manipulated at all as a
means of achieving either balance-of-payments adjustments or any of
the other major economic targets.
We now turn to the period of continually rising foreign exchange
reserves, from early 1952 to the end of 1958. Let us examine a few criti-
cal policy variables for this period to see whether their behavior is
consistent with the assumption that they were manipulated in accord-
ance with the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment. These
variables are: (1) The direct monetary instruments—the discount rate,
the open-market rate, and the minimum-reserve ratios; (2) the rate of
expansion of money supply; (3) the budgetary balance.
To assist in balance-of-payments adjustment, the discount rate, the
open-market rate, and the minimum-reserve ratio would have to move
downward during a period of accumulating reserves. Such a move-
ment did not, in fact, take place—or if it did, was only slight—as may
be seen from Chart 4. The discount rate went down from 1952 to 1954,
up from 1955 to mid-1956, and down again until mid-1959. The over-70 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
all trend of the rate was indeed downward, but it appears insignificant
in comparison with the extensive movements of the rate within these
years. Moreover, to the degree this trend existed, it went on during
later years and thus cannot be assumed to be a response to accumulat-
ing reserves. The open-market rate is a relevant variable, it will be re-
called, only after mid-1955. Starting then, it went up until mid-1956
and thereafter moved downward until mid-1959--in close relationship
to the movements of the discount rate. The required reserve ratio was
much more stable than the former two rates. It went slightly down in
1952—53, and up in 1955—57; over-all, it can probably be regarded as
having been stable during the years under review. By this evidence,
therefore, these three monetary variables are found to have played a
neutral role, on the average, with regard to balance-of-payments ad-
justment: they were manipulated neither in the direction required for
adjustment nor in the opposite direction.
The rate of expansion in the money supply conveys a similar im-
pression. This rate was, on the average, much lower during 1952—58
than during 1950—5 1 and only slightly higher than during 1959—65. On
the other hand, balance-of-payments adjustment policy would have
required this rate to be particularly high during 1952—58. Taking into
account the fact that the GNP's rate of increase has shown a down-
ward trend, a fact which may account for a desire on the part of the
monetary authority to gradually slow down the expansion of money
supply, it cannot be argued that money supply was manipulated in a
way which would contradict the need for balance-of-payment adjust-
ment. However, the evidence certainly would not support the oppo-
site assumption. i.e., that the supply moved in a way which would be
consistent with the requirements for balance-of-payments adjustment
during 1952—58.
The budgetary balance, as may again be seen from Chart 4, gives
a similar indication. From 1952 to mid-1956, the budget had a con-
sistent surplus—in fact, only in a single quarter (II 1953) was this not
the case. From mid-1956 to the end of 1958, the budget had mostly
deficits. For the period under review as a whole, the budgetary bal-
ance was positive, while for the following years—1959—65—the budget
had deficits during most of the time and a net deficit for those years
as a whole. The substantial budgetary surplus for 1952—55—at least forGermany 71
most of the period—is alleged to have arisen accidentally.1 It may well
be so, but this would still not contradict the conclusion that during a
period in which balance-of-payments adjustment would have required
a budgetary deficit, the budget showed, in fact, mostly a surplus. It
may thus be inferred that budgetary policy during the period 1952—58
was not employed as an instrument of balance-of-payments adjustment.
Thus, during 1952—58 neither monetary policy nor budgetary policy
seem to have been manipulated in a way consistent with balance-of-
payments requirements. This conclusion is similar to the one reached
before in reference to earlier periods of imbalances, as well as to the
later years 1959—65. The over-all finding which emerges is that mone-
tary instruments and the budget were, by and large, not employed in
Germany for balance-of-payments adjustment during the period
covered in the present study.
Were these instruments used, instead, to achieve alternative tar-
gets? An attempt to analyze this question will be made with the aid of
the reference cycle method. Here, the "cycle" is determined by fluctua-
tions of the policy variable; and movements of each target variable are
examined separately to see whether any of them could explain the
cyclical pattern of the policy variable. This will not be done for the
budgetary variable; as was mentioned before, the size of the budgetary
balance—surplus or deficit—appears to be rather small most of the
time, and it is apparently not meaningful to discuss "cycles" of this
variable. The reference cycle analysis will be confined, thus, to the
direct monetary instruments: the discount rate, the open-market rate,
and the minimum-reserve ratio. These show a clear "cyclical" pattern,
and the question analyzed is whether this pattern can be associated
with the movement of any target variable. The reference dates will
therefore be determined by the turning points of these policy variables.
As was mentioned before, and as may be verified again by observing
1 This is the famous "Juliustrum," or the "Julius Tower" war chest. It resulted,
allegedly, from the accumulation during the early 1950's of funds intended to finance
Germany's participation in the planned European Defense Community—a plan which
was eventually scrapped. It is hard to believe that the German authorities indeed
based their policy on a rule which says that surpluses should be created during
certain years in order to finance deficits in later years, without regard to the effects
of the surpluses and deficits at the time in which they are maintained. It is possible,
on the other hand, that in each of these individual years actual military expenditures
were lower than had been anticipated and provided for in the budget, thus leading
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Chart 4, these three rates fluctuated in close coordination; very rarely
did they move in opposing directions. This makes it possible to define
a combined reference cycle for all three instruments. The turning
points, or reference dates, will be determined, whenever just one vari-
able moves while the others are stable, by that variable which moved.
The trough of such a cycle will be at the point in which the discount
rate, the open-market rate, and the minimum-reserve ratio are at their
lowest; while the peak will occur when they are at their highest. The
results are shown in Chart 5, where the behavior of each of the alter-
native target variables—the balance of payments, the price level, the
unemployment rate, and the rate of expansion in industrial produc-
tion—is shown along the reference cycles. The turning points of these
cycles are as follows:
Period Trough Peak Trough
1950—54 IV 1950 I 1952 III 1954
1954—59 III 1954 II 1956 111959
1959—62 II 1959 III 1960 I 1962
1962—66 I 1962 III 1966
Chart 5,partA, shows the movement of foreign exchange reserves.
Ascould be expected from the previous analysis, no regularity can be
seen here. Conformity with balance-of-payments adjustment would re-
quire this variable to fall during the trough-to-peak phase—that is,
where the discount rate and the other rates are rising—and to rise dur-
ing the peak-to-trough phase. In fact, nothing resembling such a pat-
tern can be discerned.
It may be worthwhile to examine alternative definitions of the bal-
ance-of-payments target in order to see whether they can give a better
clue to policy measures than the simple change in foreign exchange re-
serves (that is, the simple balance-of-payments surplus or deficit as
these are usually defined). Thus, it is conceivable that monetary meas-
ures were taken in reaction not to changes in the balance-of-payments
as a whole, but to movements in the trade account alone. This is exam-
ined in Chart 5, part B, where the balance of trade (in goods) is repre-
sented. Again, no regular pattern appears. This balance was continu-
ously positive after about mid-1952. An assumption that movements
of this variable determined the direction of movement of the policy
variables would require the balance to have been negative along theGold and Foreign Exchange Reserves
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trough-to-peakphase, or at least to be lower than during the peak-to-
trough phase, when it would be expected to be higher and rising.
In fact, no such regular pattern could be observed.
Another possibility is that it was not the direction of change (i.e.,
rise or fall) of foreign exchange reserves which guided policy meas-
ures, but the rate of their change. That is,it may be assumed that
whenever the rate of increase in reserves accelerated, monetary policy
became expansionary; while whenever the rate of increase fell, mone-
tary policy became restrictive. This assumption is examined in Chart
5, part C. By the evidence of this chart, it must be rejected. In fact, for
part of the period the opposite is true: from the peak of the 1954—59
cycle (that is, from mid-1956) the rate of increase of reserves goes down
during the downward phase and up during the rising phase. That is,
when the rate of increase of foreign exchange reserves falls, monetary
policy becomes more expansive rather than more restrictive.
Still another possibility which may deserve examination is that the
German authorities paid attention not to the actual movement of for-
eign exchange reserves but to the divergence in the size of reserves
from some desired level. This "desired" level could be determined by
a probably infinite amount of assumptions, or models. The two sim-
plest assumptions would be: (1) that the "desired" level is that indi-
cated by the trend (which, in turn, can be identified in a variety of
ways—a moving average, a linear or log-linear regression, etc.); or (2)
that the "desired" size of reserves is a given proportion of imports (or
of current transactions). The assumption of a "desired" level of re-
serves was tested only by the use of the latter variant. This is done in
Chart 5, part D. "Desired" reserves were assumed to be a constant
proportion of annual imports of goods, equal to the average of 1950—
51. Discrepancies between the actual level of reserves and the "desired"
level are represented in this chart.
It appears, from Chart 5, part D, that in this sense, i.e., compared
with the "desired" level, reserves were increasing throughout most of
the period, that is, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to imports
increased continuously. This process went on almost without interrup-
tion until 1961. It thus cannot be maintained that monetary policy
was designed to preserve a stable ratio of foreign exchange reserves to
imports. On the other hand, it may also be seen that until the middle
of the trough-to-peak phase of the 1959—62 policy cycle—that is, until78 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
1960—the excess of actual reserves over the "desired" level tended to
rise more slowly during the trough-to-peak than in the opposite phases.
This would be consistent with an assumption that during the 1950's
a given rate of continuous rise in the ratio of foreign exchange re-
serves was desired and that monetary policy became restrictive when
this rate was not achieved, whereas it became expansionary when it
was exceeded.
In Chart 5, part E, the target of high employment is examined. The
unemployment rate appears, from this chart (as from even a casual
look at Chart 4) to be continuously and markedly falling throughout
the period. However, no consistent association between this movement
and the cycles of monetary measures can be distinguished. It thus does
not appear that monetary policy was geared to this target. It may also
be mentioned in this connection that the large budgetary surpluses
observed during most of the first half of the 1950's were achieved at a
time of high unemployment, so that it cannot be assumed either that
budgetary policy was employed in pursuance of the target of full or
high employment.
In Chart 5, parts F and G, the stable price level target is examined.
This is done by using the rates of change in the cost of living and
wholesale price indexes, respectively. These rates showed considerable
fluctuations only at the beginning of the period, during the Korean
crisis and shortly afterwards, while for most of the remaining period
the price level appears quite stable. The rates of change in the in-
dexes, in particular of wholesale prices, are quite close to zero and do
not fluctuate greatly. What is particularly relevant, however, is the ap-
parent lack of any cyclical regularity. Had monetary policy been in-
tended to maintain price stability, we would expect to find a relatively
high rate of price increase during the trough-to-peak phase—that is,
when monetary policy becomes restrictive—and the opposite during the
peak-to-trough phase. In fact, no such regularity appears at all in the
two parts of the chart. Oddly, the cyclical patterns of 1954—59 and
1959—62, especially with regard to the cost of living index, even ap-
pear almost as mirror opposites of each other.
The target of a high rate of growth, as measured by the rate of in-
crease of industrial production, is examined in Chart 5, part H. Here
some pattern appears, although it is rather weak. It seems that, at the
beginning of the trough-to-peak phase, the rate of increase in indus-Germany 79
trial production rises. However, shortly afterwards it starts falling and
this fall continues until about the middle of the peak-to-trough stage,
when the rate starts rising. This pattern would certainly be incon-
sistent with an assumption that monetary policy was intended to
maintain a stable rate of increase of production. Monetary policy ap-
pears to be restrictive usually when the rate of increase in production
falls, whereas the opposite policy would be appropriate for achieving
the target under examination. This pattern would be consistent, on
the other hand, with an assumption that monetary policy affected the
growth rate—that restrictive monetary policy led, with a time lag, to
a decline of the rate of increase of production, while expansionary
monetary policy induced—again with some time lag—a faster rate of
increase of production.
3. Summary and Interpretation
From the evidence just analyzed it appears that none of the major tar-
gets under examination was, with any consistency, the variable with
which monetary policy (and, it should be added, most probably budg-
etary policy as well) was concerned. The only assumption which did
not seem to be refuted was that monetary policy during the 1950's was
intended to maintain a steady rate of increase in the ratio of foreign
exchange reserves to imports. While such a policy rule is conceivable,
the support given to this possibility from the present analysis is prob-
ably not strong enough to establish a valid claim for it.
This may lead to one or more of these possible interpretations: (1)
The policy instruments under review were manipulated, as a rule, in
the service of another target than those examined here; (2) the instru-
ments were used to achieve one of the investigated targets, but this
could not be revealed by the present analysis; or (3) policy instruments
were indeed used "inconsistently" or, rather, not in adherence to a
fixed pattern of rules. They were used on certain occasions for balance-
of-payments adjustment, while on others they were used with the object
of maintaining price stability or in pursuance of alternative targets.
The first possibility cannot be conclusively rejected. The number
of potential target variables is infinite, and it is always possible that
one of those which have not been investigated is the real villain of
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targets that have been examined would yield better results. Monetary
policy, for instance, might be found to be consistently associated with
shifts of foreign exchange reserve levels (or prices, or emp'oyment,
etc.) away from certain "desired" paths of change in these magnitudes
which have not been explored here. Any assertion one way or the other
must thus be based only on conjecture and judgment. On these
grounds, it would seem highly unlikely that monetary policy was in-
deed employed consistently in the pursuance of some other untested
target. This assertion is supported by the lack of any suggestion of
such other policy targets in the literature of German monetary devel-
opments. This possibility must, therefore, be dismissed—although no
attempt can be made here to offer definitive proof that such a dis-
missal is warranted.
The two remaining explanations seem to be more probable. A
possible deficiency in the method of analysis, it will be recalled, is its
failure to distinguish between realized and anticipated values. Thus,
if avoiding fluctuations of a certain magnitude is the purpose of policy
measures, and these fluctuations are correctly anticipated and success-
fully averted, the data would not show correlations of policy meas-
ures with movements in the target. In the case of Germany, something
of this sort may have occurred for price stability. According to frequent
and emphatic statements of German policy makers, price stability has
been by far the most important target of monetary policy in Germany
during the period under review. As will be recalled, the present in-
vestigation does not show this. No consistent reaction of monetary
policy to changes in the degree of price stability can be detected. This
may conceivably be due to the fact that price increases were antici-
pated accurately, and counteracting policies were taken quickly and
decisively enough to prevent these anticipated increases from material-
izing. The virtually complete stability of prices from 1952 to 1957
might be explained in this way, for instance. It is, of course, very
difficult to test such an assumption rigorously, since the process by
which policy makers' anticipations were formed is not likely to be
easily uncovered. It should be recalled, however, that price fluctuations
were not entirely absent. On a number of occasions, price increases
were large enough and persistent enough to suggest that further price
rises must have been anticipated at those periods; and yet, no restric-Germany 81
tive monetary measures are found to have been taken consistently in
such periods. A prime example is the period from early 1961 to mid-
1962, when monetary policy was expansive despite a relatively high
rate of price increase—particularly in the cost of living.
Longer-term observations, on the other hand, lend more credibility
to the opinion that price stability was indeed a prime target. In Chart
6, movements of the two price levels (wholesale and cost of living) in
Germany are compared with the movements of price levels (arithmetic
unweighted averages) in the aggregate of eleven countries: the Group
of Ten and Switzerland. It is immediately apparent that prices in
Germany tended to rise considerably less than the average—although
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this holds true more for consumer prices than for wholesale prices,
and applies more to the first half of the period studied than to the
latter half. In the first half of the period, up until around 1957—58,
the rate of unemployment in Germany was particularly high (though
declining), and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves persisted
throughout these years. Had either full employment or balance-of-
payments equilibrium been the overweening target, expansionary
monetary and fiscal measures would have been called for; the fact
that such measures were not taken suggests that during these years,
at least, price stability was a major target in Germany. In other words,
it seems probable, by this evidence, that monetary and budgetary pol-
icy would have been more expansive throughout the 1950's had not
the maintenance of price stability been a prime target for policy
makers in Germany. Thus, for instance, the discount rate and other
interest rates would have been expected to be generally lower had it
not been for this target. At the same time, the former evidence sug-
gests that in formulating changes in short-term monetary and budg-
etary policy the preservation of stable prices was not invariably, or
even in the majority of instances, the guiding rule.
In formulating these short-term reactions it seems most likely, in-
deed, that no single target consistently dominated the use of monetary
policy in Germany. This policy was thus less dogmatic and more flexi-
ble than might be inferred from various analyses or statements of
policy makers in Germany. On occasion, the policy was aimed at pre-
venting price increases. This is probably true, for instance, for the
period 1955—56. On other occasions, such as during parts of 1959 or
in late 1960 and in 1961, it must be interpreted as being intended to
correct imbalances of payments; while on still other occasions it might
have been used to counteract a slump in business conditions.
This analysis was carried somewhat beyond the immediate question
of balance-of-payments adjustment. In the light of its mainly negative
and inconclusive results, it is time to ask again what wasthebalance-
of-payments policy in Germany. The probable answer seems to be,
in summary form, as follows.
In the devaluation cycle of September 1949, Germany—although not
devaluing the mark to the same extent as the British pound was de-
valued—established an exchange rate which proved later to have beenGermany 83
higher than the rate required for balance-of-payments equilibrium.
Thus, for most of the following decade, Germany's balance of pay-
ments showed a persistent surplus, and foreign exchange reserves ac-
cumulated. There was no attempt to counteract this accumulation
owing, presumably, to two considerations. First, starting from a low
level of reserves and realizing a fast growth in the amount of trade,
the increase in reserves must have been seen by Germany as desirable.
Second, a policy to correct imbalances of payments would have called
for price increases, while the maintenance of price stability must have
been regarded a prime target in view of Germany's earlier inflationary
experience. At the same time, temporary downward movements of re-
serves in the late 1950's were not a cause for major concern in view of
the large size of reserves, and thus did not call necessarily for an
adjusting policy. This largely "neutral" policy was changed in the
early 1960's. At that time, the relatively high level of interest rates
in Germany, combined with expectations for revaluation of the mark
which were formed by the persistent German surpluses, attracted large
amounts of short-term capital from abroad. Monetary policy reacted
first in a restrictive way, that is, in a disadjusting direction. At that
stage, however, such a policy was self-defeating, since the increased
interest rates acted more to increase liquidity by attracting more for-
eign capital than they contributed to the reduction of liquidity by
reducing domestic borrowing. Also, foreign resistance to the persistent
large-scale accumulation of reserves in Germany became much more
severe than it had been earlier. In late 1960, as a result, monetary
policy was changed in the expansive direction required for balance-
of-payments adjustment. In March 1961, this was combined with an
upward revaluation of the mark by 5 per cent. In the following years,
policy reaction to upward disturbances mainly took the form of spe-
cial measures intended to influence capital movements—that is,to
discourage the flow of capital to Germany—such as the tax on income
from German bonds held by foreigners, which was announced in 1964.
Balance-of-payments adjustment does not appear to have been a major
target in these years either: an accumulation of reserves still does not
seem to be considered a disturbance, while temporary falls in reserves
were not of major concern due to the high level of reserves. The as-
sumption of policy makers in Germany appears to have been that in-84 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
come and price developments independent of Germany's monetary
policy, and in particular developments in Germany's major trading
partners, would restore equilibrium to Germany's balance of pay-
ments before an unduly large decline of reserves took place. Over-all
monetary and fiscal policy thus has not been primarily tied to balance-
of-payments requirements.